State of Utah v. Jerry Lee Velard : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
State of Utah v. Jerry Lee Velard : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
MARTIN VERHOEF; Attorney for AppellantATTORNEY GENERAL OF UTAH; Attorneys for
Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Velarde, No. 16915 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2194
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
--------------









BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN 
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR., 
JUDGE, PRESIDING 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
.,-
MARTIN VERHOEF 
431 South 300 East, Suite 104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
FILED 
DEC 1 S 1980 
_.......... ... _ .. _______ .. ____ .... ____ -·--___...i Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE----------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT---------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL----------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS------------------------------ 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE GUILTY VERDICT----- 2 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
REVERSIBLE ERROR BY REFUSING 






McWilliams v. State, 294 So.2d 454 (Court of 
Criminal Appeals of Alabama, 1974)-------- 13 











v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978)----------
v. Garcia, 355 P.2d 57 (Utah 1960)------------
v. Heath, 27 Utah 2d 13, 492 P.2d 978 (1972)--
v. Jones, 554 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1976)-----------
v. Kinsey, 66 Utah 348, 295 Pac. 247 (1931)---
v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980)-------------
v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P.2d 211 (1952)---
v. Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 244 P.2d 653 (1952)--












2 State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977)------------
Wiggins v. State, 347 So.2d 543 (Ala. Cr. App. 
1977)------------------------------------- 14 
-i-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16915 
.JERRY LEE VELARDE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent takes no exception to the Appellant's 
Brief under these headings and adopts it for its own state-
ment as to those matters. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of the Facts is reasonably 
accurate and complete with two exceptions: 
Randy Lockwood's identification of the Appellant 
was positive not "tentatively" (T. 7). 
Dennis Quintana who aided the Appellant in 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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transporting the stolen property by cab from 874 East South 
Temple to 128 B Street had no doubt in his mind that the 
property in question was stolen even though he didn't 
question the other two about that (T. 88). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE GUILTY VERDICTS. 
It is well established in Utah that in order 
for a convicted defendant to succeed in challenging on 
appeal the sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial, he 
must establish that the evidence was so inconclusive or 
insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. 
State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978); State v. 
Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977); State v. Jones, 554 P.2d 
1321 (Utah 1976). Those cases also establish that in 
considering a claim of insufficiency of the evidence on 
appeal, this Court must assume that the trier of fact 
believed those aspects of the evidence and drew such 
reasonable inferences therefrom as support the verdict. 
Mere possession of recently stolen property, 
when not coupled with other culpatory or incriminating 
facts, does not alone justify a conviction. 
In State v. Kinsey, 66 Utah 348, 295 Pac. 247 
(1931), this Court said: Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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. . . [p]ossession of articles 
recently stolen, when coupled with 
circumstances of hiding or concealing 
them, or of disposing or attempting to 
dispose of them, or of making false or 
unreasonable or unsatisfactory 
explanations of the possession, may be 
sufficient to connect the possessor with 
the commission of the offense. 
Id. at 249. Accord, State v. Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 244 
P. 2d 653 (1952). 
In State v. Heath, 27 Utah 2d 13, 492 P.2d 
978 (1972), the Court said: 
[i]n addition to the ... 
possession by the defendant, there must 
be proof of corroborating circumstances 
tending to themselves to show guilt. 
Such corroborating circumstances may 
consist of the acts, conduct, falsehoods, 
if any, or other declarations, if any, of 
the defendant which tend to show his 
guilt. 
Id. at 979. 
Appellant's Brief at page 11 admits "it is 
undisputed that subsequently the property was found in 
the presence of or in the posssession of Dennis Quintana, 
Randy Velarde or appellant, Jerry Lee Velarde or some 
combination of these three individuals." The trial lapse 
was only two hours at the outside ("from 2: 00 p.m. until 4: 00 
p.m. of the same day) (Tr. 17, 27".""29). 
Appellant here makes no specif·ic attack on the 
sufficiency of the evidence but only cites the cases of 
Cooper, Mills and Williams as authority that this Court 
may use to vacate the judgment entered in this cause and to 
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remand the case to the district court for a new trial. 
The State concedes that this Court has such power and 
the fact that there was no motion for a new trial would 
not present a barrier to such relief in a proper case. 
What the State does contend is that this is not a proper 
case for such relief. 
In State v._Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764, 
770 (1949), the Court pointed out in that portion of its 
opinion quoted by appellant that such relief is to be 
granted only when the right to it is "quite clearly 
shown." In this case such right is not shown at all, 
much less clearly shown. 
In State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P.2d 211 
(1952), as appellant noted at page 8 of his brief, the 
legal test of insufficiency is "inherently improbable 
as to be unworthy of belief." Here the evidence was not 
only worthy of belief but there is in evidence the opinion 
of the appellant's companion that on the day in question 
there was no doubt in his mind that the subject property 
was stolen. This was Dennis Quintana who testified as 
follows: 
Q. What happened then? 
A. They left. 
Q. Who is they? 
A. Randy and Jerry. 
Q. How long was this after Jerry got back? 
A. Just a few minutes. 
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Q. Anybody else leave with them? 
A. No. 
Q. And where were you at this time? 
A. In the living room. 
Q. Okay, who was there with you? 
A. Me and my friend and their friend, the 
owner of the apartment. 
Q. And how long do you think they were 
gone at this time? 
A. Fifteen, twenty minutes. 
Q. Did they have anything with them 
when they came back the second time? 
A. Yes. They had some stereo equipment 
and things. 
Q. Can you be a little bit more specific 
in regards to stereo equipment and things? 
A. They had speakers, reel to reel and 
some cameras. That is all I saw. 
Q. Okay. Do you have any idea about 
what time this was? 
A. I would say it was close to 1:00. 
I don't know, we didn't have a clock. 
Q. So sometime in the early afternoon? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What happened then then after they 
came back to the apartment with this equipement? 
A.- Well, I was expecting a radio but, 
they Qame back with much more. I just kind of 
looked at them, you know, and they just sort 
of put everything down and looked it over. 
Q. Did you have any conversation in 
regards--with them in regards to where 
this had come from? 
A. Not really. 
Q. Did you overhear them saying anything 
in regards to where it had come from? 
A. Not that I recall. 
Q. Did you ever ask them any questions 
about whether it was theirs or not? 
A. No, I didn't. 
(Tr . 6 8- 6 9 . ) 
Q. Okay. Did you ask them any questions 
concerning where this had come from, or what 
they were going to do with it? 
A. No, I didn't ask no questions. 
Q. Okay. Did you overhear any conversation 
with them in regards to where it had come from, 
or what they were planning on doing with this 
equipment? 
-C::.-
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A. Well, they had planned on selling it. 
Q. Okay. Well, now, you said they 
planned on selling it. Let me go back. 
What did you hear that made you believe that? 
A. Well, they were estimating how much 
they could get for the individual pieces. 
MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, I am going to 
object, Your Honor, and ask that be stricken 
from the record unless a proper foundation 
has been laid as to who said what. 
THE COURT: Let's lay a foundation, Mr. 
Fuchs, or we will strike it all. 
Q. Where were you when you heard this 
conversation, where were you all when they 
were talking about this? 
A. We were at the apartment on South 
Temple. 
Q. Okay, on South Temple still? Okay. 
And who was present? 
A. I was, Randy was there, Jerry was 
there, and my girlfriend, Cindy was there. 
Q. Okay. Now, in regards to what they 
said about selling, what specifically did you 
hear in regards to these matters and who was 
specifically involved in this conversation? 
Who was the conversation between that you 
overheard? 
THE COURT: That is the fourth question. 
One at a time. Let's rephrase them one at a 
time. Who was present period. 
Q. Who was present? 
THE COURT: We have that. 
Q. Okay. Then, who was the 
conversation between? 
THE COURT: What time was it to the:best 
of his recollection in relation to when they 
came back with it. 
Q. What time was it to the best of your 
recollection when they came back? 
THE COURT: That is how much longer after 
they brought it back, or in relation to when 
you left there? 
A. About two hours. 
Q. Okay, so this was just before you left 
in the cab? 
-6-
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A. Yes. 
Q. And who had this conversation? 
A. Jerry and Randy. 
Q. And this conversation was 
specifically between those two? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was it exactly that you 
overheard? 
A. I overheard comments. 
MR. VERHOEF: Your Honor, if I could 
ask the witness to respond by saying who 
said what as opposed to just a general 
conversation. · 
THE COURT: Well, he can ask him--
tell us who said what. 
A. I couldn't tell you who said what. 
I can just tell you the comments that I 
heard. 
THE COURT: Those two together? 
A. Right. 
Q. Would you go ahead and tell us 
what you heard? 
A. Just they were just trying to name 
prices on what they would get for individual 
items that they had. 
Q. Do you remember any specific prices 
that they talked about? 
A. They would say could sell a camera for 
like a hundred dollars. 
(Tr. 72-74.) 
Q. Now, it was this time you thought 
in your own mind this property had been stolen? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You hadn't known these people at all 
prior to this night? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Yet you didn't ask any questions in 
regards to where this property had come from? 
A. It wasn't necessary. _ 
Q. But, you knew in your own mind it had 
been stolen? 
A. Correct. Therefore, it wasn't 
necessary to ask questions. 
Q. And, you all made just one trip down 
to the cab? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember who carried what? 
A. I remember I carried a speaker. 
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In State v. Williams, 111 Utah 379, 180 P.2d 551 
(1947), where a judgment in a rape case involving a 13 year 
old subnormal girl whose mental age was between 8 and 10 
and who had frequent epileptic seizures was reversed and 
the case remanded, the State's evidence was of a totally 
different quality than in this case. There the Court 
said immediately following the quote from Appel~ant's 
Brief at page 8: 
~This is not to say that merely by 
reason- of the fact that the circumstances 
surrounding an alleged assault of this 
nature created a reasonable doubt in the 
mind of this court that the offense was 
in fact committed, we will set aside a 
verdict. The total picture presented by 
the record here considered must be kept in 
mind in evaluating the result here reached. 
We have before us not merely a happening 
which must be considered not in harmony 
with general experience, coupled with the 
doubtful testimonial capacity of the only 
witness to the principal fact in issue, 
but the further fact that such witness 
was suffering from an affliction which 
itself might account both for her physical 
condition and for her story of the improbable 
attack. 
Id. at 555. 
The facts with respect to the credibility of the 
State's key witnesses in these two cases are so totally 
dissimilar as to be virtually useless as a guiding 
precedent in the instant case. 
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that reasonable 
minds must have entertained reasonable doubt about his guilt. 
State v. Daniels, supra; State v. w.;, ~'"'"'"' .... ,, .............. • l"'.L.-.L.-. ·r. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Jones, supra. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY REFUSING TO CHARGE THE JURY WITH 
A REQUESTED, REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE 
HYPOTHESIS INSTRUCTION. 
Respondent respectfully submits that there are 
three main situations with respect to the principle of law 
that no conviction can be upheld when one of the material 
issues is established by circumstantial evidence unless 
"such circumstance must reasonably preclude any reasonable 
hypothesis of defendant's innocence." State v. Garcia, 
355 P.2d 57 (Utah, 1960) .at 60. First, when the defendant 
offers evidence which the jury might find provides a 
reasonable hypothesis consistent with defendant's innocence. 
Second, when that_ evidence is "so conclusive that a 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence has been proved that a 
contrary holding would be beyond the bounds of reason." 
Garcia at 60. Third, when no evidence of such a reasonable 
hypothesis is presented. Appellant submits that the facts 
in this case place it within the third category above. 
Appellant's reliance on Garcia is misplaced. Garcia 
in dicta approved on a so-called "Hodge Rule" instruction 
(without denominating it as such) when one of the material 
facts essential to the offense is established by circumstantial 
evidence. Garcia was a direct evidence case. It certainly 
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does not stand for the proposition that failure to give 
an instruction of the requested type is error when the 
evidence of the offense is circumstantial but the defendant 
has not presented any evidence from which the jury could 
find innocence upon the basis of a reasonable hypothesis 
based on the record (situation third above). 
The only other authority advanced by appellant in 
his brief on this point is State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 
(Utah, 1980). That case did not involve any requested 
jury instruction. It could not therefore stand for the 
proposition that failure to give the requested instruction 
is error under these-facts. In fact, respondent urges 
this Court to apply the principle that the Hodge's Rule 
is in "reality nothing more than another manner of stating 
the burden of proof applicable in all criminal cases, 
viz, beyond a reasonable doubt." (at 232). There is no 
contention here that the jury was not correctly instructed 
as to that burden. The record shows it was (R.128). 
The Lamm case in equating the above principle with 
the instruction as to proof beyond a reasonable doubt said: 
"The key word in either concept is that of 'reasonable'." 
As noted above the appellant did not establish any 
reasonable hypothesis in the record. Likewise, none is set 
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forth in his brief. In short no reasonable hypothesis 
of innocence exists in this case and hence the court's 
refusal to give the requested instruction was not error. 
Appellant impliedly concedes that the receiving 
stolen property was not based on circumstantial evidence 
as to any of its elements. See Appellant's Brief, page 11, 
where the attack on the refusal to instruct as requested 
refers only to the burglary charge. This is important 
because the requested instruction would .have been improper 
if the offense tried related only to receiving stolen 
property. Appellant respectfully submits that the trial 
judge properly exercised his discretion in not giving the 
subject instruction as he may have correctly concluded that 
it would be unduly confusing to the jury to be asked to 
apply that instruction as to the one offense charged and 
not as to the other. Such caution was particularly 
appropriate in light of cautionary note as to such 
instructions in Garcia, p. 60. This requires care to use 
language which the jury would understand and which would 
not merely.lend to their confusion. 
Even if this Court determines that failure to 
give such an instruction was error under the facts of this 
case, appellant submits it was harmless error. There could 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be no doubt but that the appellant and his brother received 
stolen property. It is no mystery as to where, when and from 
whom the property was stolen. The only significant factual 
questions are whether the property with which they were 
caught red handed and concerning which they were planning to 
sell (see Tr.73,74) was stolen by both of them or by which 
one if not by both. The jury found a reasonable doubt as 
to appellant's brother's guilt upon the basis of his 
testimony. It is inescapable from the evidence in this 
case and from logic that one or both of the defendants 
committed the burglary. The issue was not whether either 
defendant was guilty or innocent of the burglary but only 
which brother was guilty if both were not. Any error 
in the instructions in connection with the conviction of 
a guilty burglar was harmless error now that the other 
brother was found not guilty. 
This Court has never held, and should not now, 
that the requested instruction must be given in a 
circumstantial case (and especially not when a direct 
evidence offense is tried in the same proceeding)# when 
the reasonable hypothesis of innocence is not established 
in the record~ To require that such be established as 
a condition for requiring it being given would not 
per se require a defendant to testify and expose himself 
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to self incrimination on cross examination as a reasonable 
hypothesis in many cases could be established by other 
witnesses or other evidence. In the event it cannot be 
established otherwise, however, respondent submits it 
would not be unfair for the defendant to choose between 
testifying and receiving the benefit of that instruction 
or to remain silent and not have such an instruction. In 
the latter situation, as in this case, the defendant would 
have the benefit of the beyond a reasonable doubt instruction 
and could argue that any hypothesis, however fanciful or 
unsubstantiated in the record, should be sufficient in the 
juro~'s mind to return a verdict of not guilty. 
In the case of Mcwilliams v. State, 294 So.2d 454 
(Court of Criminal Appeals_ of Alabama, 1974), the appellant 
requested "Charge No. 15--I charge you, members of the 
jury, that you must find the defendant not guilty if the 
conduct of the defendant upon a reasonable hypothesis 
is consistent with defendant's innocence." The trial 
court refused the instruction. Said- appellate court 
said on this point: 
While refused charge fifteen was 
held to be a proper charge in Gregory v. 
State, 140 Ala. 11, 27 So. 259, the 
more recent Appellate Court opinions are 
committed to the view that the refusal 
of this charge is not error since said 
charge is not hypothesized on the 
evidence. Foster v. State, 37 Ala·.App. 
213, 66 So.2d 204 and authorities 
therein cited. 
-13-
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The above case was cited favorable and applied in 
the later case of Wiggins v. State, 347 So.2d 543 (Ala. 
Cr. App. 1977). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has not established a sound legal basis 
to overturn the judgment of guilt of burglary and receiving 
stolen property. Those judgments should therefor be affirmed, 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed two true and correc 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Mr. Martin 
Verhoef, Attorney for Appellant, 431 South 300 East, Suite 
104, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 15th day of December, 
1980. 
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